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Abstract—Research in network traffic measurement and analy-
sis is a long-lasting field with growing interest from both scientists
and the industry. However, even after so many years, results
replication, criticism, and review are still rare. We face not only a
lack of research standards, but also inaccessibility of appropriate
datasets that can be used for methods development and evalua-
tion. Therefore, a lot of potentially high-quality research cannot
be verified and is not adopted by the industry or the community.
The aim of this paper is to overcome this controversy with a
unique solution based on a combination of distinct approaches
proposed by other research works. Unlike these studies, we focus
on the whole issue covering all areas of data anonymization,
authenticity, recency, publicity, and their usage for research
provability. We believe that these challenges can be solved
by utilization of semi-labeled datasets composed of real-world
network traffic and annotated units with interest-related packet
traces only. In this paper, we outline the basic ideas of the
methodology from unit trace collection and semi-labeled dataset
creation to its usage for research evaluation. We strive for this
proposal to start a discussion of the approach and help to
overcome some of the challenges the research faces today.
I. INTRODUCTION
Research in the area of network traffic measurement and
analysis is heavily data-driven. Good research is closely linked
to the availability of network data that are realistic, current,
well-documented, and publicly available ideally. Without such
data and standards of their usage, researchers have limited
research opportunities, cannot reliably prove their results, and
tend to repeat common mistakes [1]. However, a creation of
such data is, in itself, one of the challenges of the research
area. Neither real-world data nor artificial data are sufficient
as research input. Real-world data suffer from insufficient
annotation and problems with anonymization. Artificially gen-
erated data, on the other hand, typically contain a limited
set of network traffic types and do not reflect the specifics
associated with real-world networks [8]. As a result, there
is no generally accepted type of research data, which results
in researchers’ inability to justify their results, as proposed
by Krishnamurthy et al. [12]. This fact is confirmed by the
small number of publications focused on verification of others
researchers’ results, such as the work by Mehedi at al. [16],
despite the fact that verification of others researchers’ results
is one of the pillars of science.
Although the need for research data in the area of net-
work measurement and analysis was emphasized over the last
decades, we still do not have a solution that the research
community would agree on. Several widely accepted works,
however, emerged during this period with the aim to bring
us closer to an agreement. Well-known examples of such
works are KDD [11] and DARPA [17] datasets and evaluation
approaches focused on an analysis of network traffic and
anomaly detection. The fact that these datasets are still widely
used despite being almost twenty years old and facing criticism
since their introduction [15] illustrates how much is a generally
approved data source needed. In addition to these, other
publicly available datasets have emerged to date based on a
collection of network traffic from security competitions such
as DEF CON [18], or have been generated using a simulated
environment [3], [26], [28]. The opposite approach to the
creation of research data is addressed by organizations like
CAIDA [6], which provide real-world packet traces, but which
have limited use possibilities due to anonymization and lack of
annotation. Recently, top conferences put emphasis on publish-
ing the research data along with research results [2]. Analysis
by Grajeda et al. [9] shows that despite the encouragement it
is not common research practice so far.
The ultimate challenge of the research in the area of
network measurement and analysis is a methodology for the
creation of packet trace datasets that are modifiable, extensible,
reproducible, and can be publicly shared [8]. We propose to
use semi-labeled datasets in order to achieve this goal. These
datasets consist of so-called annotated units of network traffic,
which are composed of interest-related packet traces only.
These traces, with a defined process of their normalization,
can be combined not only together but also with a real-world
traffic in order to form semi-labeled datasets. Assuming that
researchers have access to real-world traffic in their labs, the
proposed approach will enable a simple creation of customized
datasets. While the real-world traffic captures need to be kept
private, the annotated units can be freely shared since they only
contain the interest-based trace of traffic with a minimum of
private information. We do not claim that semi-labeled datasets
provide a universal solution to all problems related to dataset
creation, usage, and sharing. However, we aim to show, that
it offers more benefits than other current approaches.
In this article, we demonstrate benefits of our approach to an
anomaly detection research problem. We discuss problematic
areas and demonstrate how our approach helps to mitigate
some of the problems and how it compares to existing dataset
creation methods. The paper serves as both an initial intro-
duction to the concept of semi-labeled datasets, and as a
discussion of relative merits of other approaches compared
to our own. We are aware that there is no one-size-fits-all
solution, but we believe that our approach helps to overcome
many of the challenges the researchers still face today.
The rest of the paper is organized into sections according
to areas related to usage of network traffic datasets. Sec-
tion II defines creation process of annotated units. Section III
presents a methodology of their usage. Section IV discusses
possibilities of research data sharing. Section V addresses the
use of the presented approach for research evaluation. Lastly,
Section VI summarizes and concludes the whole approach
based on semi-labeled datasets.
II. CREATION OF ANNOTATED UNITS
There is a number of factors that determine the usefulness
and applicability of a newly created dataset. Both richness
of content and quality of annotation depend on the process
of dataset creation. Real-world network traces often require
anonymization and are impossible to annotate accurately.
Artificially created laboratory traffic, on the other hand, is
often thin on content and may be biased. Ultimately, the
best method of creating a dataset depends on the purpose
of the dataset. The result is always a compromise between
authenticity and accuracy of annotation. In this paper, we
focus on datasets used for verification of network traffic
analysis methods and propose an approach to reduce those
compromises to maximize both authenticity and accuracy.
Two types of datasets can be generated from network traffic.
The first type is network packet traces, which are created by
capturing traffic at a certain point of the network. The second,
one aggregation level above packet traces, is flow traces, which
are collected as an output of a flow monitoring process. Both
types are used in attack and anomaly research, but we focus
only on packet traces, as they are a superset of flow traces and
can be converted to flows if needed. Moreover, the content of
flow traces depends on flow exporter configuration. Having
the raw packet data, one can always prepare the flow traces
according to their needs.
Applicable datasets used for the verification of network
traffic measurement and analysis methods must address the
following four challenges related to their creation and usage:
∙ Anonymization – It is difficult to anonymize traffic
including application data and preserve consistency of
data in a network, transport, and application layers as
shown by Yurcik et al. [31].
∙ Traffic annotation – Either the traffic is captured from
a live network and then annotation is inaccurate or the
traffic is artificially generated with annotation and then
its authenticity is compromised.
∙ Capture parameters – It is often unclear how the dataset
was captured. Various settings such as network topology,
network capacity, utilization, and latency might affect the
dataset creation but are usually not measured or provided.
∙ Dataset recency – Datasets are created at a certain point
in time, however, the composition of traffic on a network
is ever changing. Therefore, each fixed dataset becomes
obsolete in time [1].
To mitigate these issues, we propose to create a set of
smaller datasets called annotated units, which can be com-
bined with real-world background traffic into semi-labeled
datasets. Each annotated unit is a normalized dataset contain-
ing a single event, such as a network attack. For example,
a unit containing a brute-force SSH attack would consist of
several complete connections of the attacker trying a different
password against service on port 22. Such a unit could capture
a time interval of several minutes, hours, or even days.
Creation of the annotated unit can be accomplished either
by filtering the desired traffic from an existing network or by
capturing a traffic from a prepared environment. An obstacle
to the first approach is that it requires a capturing device and
an exact knowledge of traffic parameters such as the protocol,
IP addresses, and ports. Moreover, the background traffic can
influence the desired traffic unpredictably by causing delays or
by causing packet drops in case of too high network utilization.
A prepared environment does not have these obstacles but
suffers from its own problems, which are mainly related
to difficulty in the environment setup. In our opinion the
latter approach is superior. To alleviate its obstacles and to
simplify its usage we have prepared a virtual environment to
emulate the attacker-defender interactions, see Figure 1. The
environment is set up using Vagrant [21] and as its input it
only requires commands to be run at an attacker and defender
hosts. The complete environment is built from scratch on every
run, which greatly aids repeatability of the whole process. The
software with an example of annotated units is available as
an open-source at https://github.com/CSIRT-MU/TraceShare.
Although the virtual environment was used to create datasets
before [10], [23], we are the first to focus on automation and
repeatability of the creation of individual attack units rather
than the whole dataset including background traffic.
Fig. 1. Architecture of the TraceCreator virtual environment.
Following the creation, the annotated units have to be nor-
malized and injected into the real-world background traffic to
create the semi-labeled dataset. The purpose of normalization
is to ensure that the annotated units can be treated uniformly in
the injection process. We propose the following steps: change
MAC and IP addresses to values not usually encountered in
traffic, differentiate attackers’ and defenders’ IP addresses,
and reset timestamps of packets so that the first one starts at
zero epoch time. These steps ensure uniformity of annotated
units. Tools such as tcprewrite and editcap can be used for
this process. We also propose the use of the PcapNg [25]
format, because it is supported by the majority of traffic
processing tools and offers extended timestamp precision,
capture statistics, mixed link layer types, and user comments
in addition to original Pcap format. The whole process of
combining the annotated units with real-world background
traffic is discussed in more detail in Chapter III.
We assert that the proposed approach addresses all the
aforementioned issues of the current network traffic datasets.
Anonymity and consistency are trivially achieved because
the unit contains only controlled traffic that is not sensitive,
normalization requires more attention. Annotation is accurate
because the content of units is completely known. Capture
parameters are both known and easily altered on demand
due to the capture happening in a virtual environment with
easy repeatability. Data recency is achieved by manipulating
the pieces of traffic that can be either combined with newer
background traffic to simulate the old attacks in new traffic
conditions, or replaced by newer versions of attacks.
In addition, the proposed approach provides a number of
advantages. By dealing with isolated pieces of traffic it lowers
the barrier of data sharing. It enables tailoring the datasets for
specific environments by means of mixing them with provided
background traffic. It enables simple alteration of traffic pa-
rameters in the virtual environment, thus providing variations
of the same attack, e.g., in low-latency communication over
a local wired network, in large distance communication, or
using a poor wireless connection. Last but not least, it enables
gradual updating of existing datasets, thus facilitating an
ongoing validation of detection methods.
Despite the overall improvement this approach brings, there
is still a number of issues that require addressing. First, the
sharing of a background traffic is still a problem because of
anonymity concerns. While everybody can create their own
dataset using their own background traffic to test detection
methods in their own environment, a direct comparison of
detection methods requires a complete re-evaluation using a
local dataset. The second issue is the normalization process.
Any attempt to change the link and network layer information
in the packet headers can lead to inconsistencies with higher
level protocols. Therefore, the normalization of each annotated
unit must be evaluated for its potential negative impact. New
tools have to be developed to provide greater flexibility for
normalization of higher level protocols. For example, when
DNS traffic is involved, we need to be able to transparently
change the association between DNS names and IP addresses.
Although much of this work is common to anonymization
as well, there is an important difference: the normalization
must maintain consistency for the intended purpose of the
dataset. When some application layer data are not used by
the tools processing the dataset, they can be safely ignored.
However, anonymization must take all the data into account
to avoid privacy issues. The third issue is related to using a
virtual environment. The system under attack is usually in its
default mode, without any data and users. Moreover, the virtual
environment provides only very limited resources. While it is
not an issue for attacks such as SSH brute-force, it might
affect the authenticity of annotated units for other attacks. For
example, an application layer DoS would generate different
responses from a production web server with many resources
than from a virtual machine utilizing only a single CPU core
and significantly limited amount of memory. Another problem
with the controlled environment is its uniformity. Although
we are able to adjust the parameters of the environment, it is
difficult to predict what will the impact be, if any, on the
detection methods. We believe that these issues should be
subject to a further research.
III. USE OF SEMI-LABELED DATASETS
The acquisition of annotated units is the first step towards
a rigorous network traffic measurement and analysis. The
second step, equally essential, is a creation of a complex
dataset suitable for the right use-case according to a coherent
methodology. For example, a dataset used for development
and evaluation of Advanced Persistent Threats detection must
contain all relevant attack types instead of network scans only.
In addition, the correct methodology of dataset creation must
be used to unify its further processing. Examples of issues
related to the use of such datasets were identified in the survey
by Tavallaee et al. [24]. The authors observed that majority
of surveyed papers have problems with obtaining suitable
datasets and use different procedures of data processing, which
complicate further research comparison. In other words, we
need to know the limitations and specifics of the dataset we are
planning to use for development and evaluation. An example
of known specifics limiting the use of public datasets is a
small, fixed range of TTL values in DARPA dataset, which
makes it unsuitable for the creation of detection methods
based on TTL-based network address translation [14]. This
section proposes a coherent methodology for the creation and
use of semi-labeled datasets for network traffic monitoring
and analysis with respect to described challenges. To ease
understanding of the methodology, we present development
of an anomaly detection method as a model use-case.
The methodology for a creation and use of semi-labeled
datasets is induced from existing implementations YD2T [28]
and FLAME [5] focused on a composition of realistic synthetic
datasets. The semi-labeled dataset is created by mixing anno-
tated units with a real-world dataset (unlabeled) containing
a background live traffic. First, a real-world dataset is cap-
tured via standard traffic access methods from real network
and statistical characteristics of the dataset are computed.
These characteristics represent for example IP address distri-
bution, TTL distribution, capture period, distribution of packet
inter-arrival times, and network link properties. Secondly,
selected annotated units are modified to reflect characteristics
of the real-world dataset computed in the previous step. It
is not always necessary to modify all characteristics. For
example, we can keep the original IP address distribution of
annotated units when developing a detection method that does
not utilize IP address for detection. In this case, original IP
addresses from annotated units can serve as a natural label of
the inserted traffic. For such labeling purposes, IP addresses
belong to a reserved range that should not be present in
real-world traffic. Thirdly, a user specifies options for dataset
merge, i.e. how many times is the annotated unit merged to a
real-world dataset, how to allocate the unit in the background
traffic (randomly vs. exact timestamp), and what labeling
method should be used (labels are a part of the dataset or
are stored externally). Last, annotated units and real-world
dataset are merged into the semi-labeled dataset. The merge
can be done for example using the mergecap tool [22] or the
aforementioned YD2T toolkit. The adjective ”semi-labeled”
refers to the fact that we are able to distinguish the injected
labeled traffic from the real one in the created dataset.
Annotated units contain only precisely defined and com-
pletely annotated traffic captured from the virtual environment
or a real network. Hence, they capture the essence of network
traffic and are suitable for initial comprehension of analyzed
network traffic and ground truth establishment. The presence
of ground truth enables us to create and evaluate various analy-
ses and detection methods rigorously. These two properties are
the most valuable assets of these annotated units. Although
the annotated units serve well to network traffic comprehen-
sion, use of annotated units without real-world data prevents
understanding of the network traffic in a broader concept.
Therefore, annotated units should be used in combination with
real-world data. The result is represented by the semi-labeled
dataset, which is a balanced trade-off between the need for
a dataset representing real-world traffic and the need for
labeled datasets. This dataset has all the main characteristics
of real-world traffic while still being able to keep the partial
comprehension. This methodology can not provide an absolute
ground truth though, as it can not guarantee an absence of un-
labeled data of interest in the whole dataset. Nevertheless, we
suggest a coherent approach to an evaluation facing this issue
in Chapter V. The semi-labeled datasets are suitable for evalu-
ation and improvement of network traffic analysis methods in a
semi-controlled environment closely resembling the real-world
conditions. The creation process (mixing annotated units with
real-world data) ensures sufficient variability and provides a
wide range of different environments for the evaluation.
Figure 2 demonstrates the use of the semi-labeled dataset on
the example of a development of network threat detection in-
spired by PDSA methodology [13]. Annotated units containing
threat-related traffic are used for initial comprehension of the
threat mechanism. Based on the comprehension, a detection
method is derived and a prototype is implemented. Optionally,
we can combine threat-related units with other annotated
units to evaluate the prototype against another, still annotated,
traffic. Once 100 % recall and precision are achieved, the
detection method works properly in a controlled environment
and is ready to be tested using a semi-labeled dataset.
Fig. 2. Usage workflow of annotated units and semi-labeled datasets.
The semi-labeled dataset is created by merging the pre-
viously used annotated units with a real-world traffic. The
detection method should still be able to detect the threats
contained in merged annotated units. Nevertheless, a false
positive (FP) detection may occur when real-world part of
the semi-labeled dataset is analyzed. All detected events from
the real-world part should be inspected manually. If the
inspection shows true positive (TP), a new annotated unit can
be created from associated traffic. In case of FP detection, a
detection algorithm is enhanced to provide the correct result.
The evaluation process is iterative. Each time a method is
enhanced, it is re-evaluated using the original semi-labeled
dataset. The re-evaluation continues until FP rate reaches the
desired level. After that, a new semi-labeled dataset can be
created by merging annotated units from the previous iteration
with a new real-world dataset. The optimization process is
repeated with the new semi-labeled dataset. In this fashion,
several semi-labeled datasets can be tested until a desired
robustness of the detection method is achieved.
The proposed methodology can be demonstrated more pre-
cisely on an SSH brute-force attack detection as follows.
First, a network traffic pattern identifying an SSH attack is
derived from an annotated unit and a prototype matching the
identified traffic pattern is implemented and evaluated against
the annotated units. Secondly, the semi-labeled dataset is used.
If a new, unlabeled SSH attack is detected, the attack is
inspected manually. It is possible that FP detection occurs
as a common traffic pattern that fits a detection pattern, e.g.
automated RDP authentication resembles SSH attack in terms
of flow count and timing. Based on the result of the inspection,
SSH attack pattern matching options are revised in case of FP,
or a label is added to the detected flows in case of TP detection.
This process is repeated until the pattern is able to detect the
SSH attack with a specific accuracy and precision.
Using the combination of annotated units and a semi-labeled
dataset allows us to develop and evaluate a detection method in
the near-real-world conditions which results in a high chance
of a successful method deployment. We also recommend
gathering a feedback from users of the detection method even
during the real-world deployment. The deployment can dis-
cover a special network traffic that could disrupt the detection.
The anomalous network traffic samples can be used for further
improvement of the method and should be collected for further
analysis, development, or sharing.
IV. DATASET SHARING
Information sharing and cooperation is a key component
of efficient research. While hackers and other cyber-attackers
are aware of this and have already adopted these habits, it is
still a challenge for a network related research community [4].
The community cooperates well thanks to a number of top
conferences, but in the case of data sharing there is clearly
room for improvement [9]. Some of these top conferences have
recently begun to address this issue and encourage authors
to share their data [2]. Aside from influencing the efficiency
of development, datasets sharing is necessary for research
repeatability and for the reproduction of results. Even so, most
researchers that use their own datasets decide not to make them
public. Previous research shows that custom datasets are made
public only in 4 % of all cases [9]. However, if there already
exists a public dataset, it is reused in 50 % of all cases. There
is clearly noticeable demand for publicly available datasets.
There are several platforms for sharing datasets currently
available. Digital Corpora [7] is a platform that stores disk im-
ages, memory dumps, and network packet captures. Pcapr [19]
is a platform that shares a large amount of network traffic
captures in the Pcap format. Similarly, Network Forensics and
Network Security Monitoring sharing platform [20] provides
another collection of packet traces with a malware network
traffic and other captured events. Unfortunately, each of these
platforms suffers from common problems.
Issues of network data sharing platforms may be categorized
into two groups. The first group contains issues that relate to
the transformation the datasets must go through prior to being
shared. This transformation encompasses anonymization and
normalization. The second group contains issues that involve
the dataset sharing platform itself. For example, what require-
ments should the platform fulfill to accommodate the needs of
as many researchers as possible while remaining user-friendly
and manageable for an extended period of time. Some of these
issues, when left unresolved, have already led to a demise
of several sharing platforms in the past. The following list
outlines these challenges and presents possible solutions so
the platform can be successfully adopted by the community.
∙ Anonymization – A process of anonymization is the
main obstacle to a publication of datasets. Assisted
anonymization of uploaded datasets should be one of
the key features of a central dataset sharing platform.
Such anonymization alleviates part of the workload the
anonymization demands from the dataset authors. This
procedure can be applied to all uploaded datasets and
significantly contributes to the credibility of the platform.
∙ Data heterogeneity – Network data are typically gath-
ered by various methods in countless different environ-
ments. A certain level of disorder is sure to develop
in such a collection and leads to difficult navigation
and complicated searching for a certain dataset. Central
sharing platform should have clearly defined types of
datasets it collects. Then it is possible to establish a
standard representation of data and adhere to it where
possible. An example is a definition of a normalization
process that will be invoked every time a new dataset is
being uploaded [30].
∙ Platform sustainability – Providing an up-to-date con-
tent is a critical part of the sharing platform and a ne-
cessity for an outgoing research [30]. Several projects of
dataset sharing platform early ended in the past after only
a few years of operation. An example is Digital Corpora,
updated for the last time in 2014. When preparing such
a project, it is necessary to include personal and finan-
cial sustainability. Another solution is a creation of the
platform as an open community hub and thus lower the
requirements for the involvement of platform managers.
∙ Initial content – Both community and centrally managed
sharing platforms must contain a sufficient number of
datasets when launched. These datasets should already
be up-to-date and usable in current research. Otherwise,
the researcher will have no incentive to visit the platform
and the project will probably end with little success.
To tackle the above-mentioned challenges, we are currently
developing a web-based centralized dataset sharing platform
that will store annotated units of network traffic data. The
sharing platform will be built upon basic functions of upload-
ing, searching, downloading, and mixing of annotated units.
Other functions will provide user account management and
inter-user communication. In our platform, the user will have
access to a wide range of annotated units uploaded by us or the
community itself. A good example of such sharing platform
is OpenML [27] focused on other areas of research. The user
interface of the OpenML platform is illustrated in Figure 3.
This platform enables the sharing of datasets for training
machine learning algorithms and provides several community
functions that are suitable to our needs as well.
Fig. 3. User interface of the OpenML sharing platform [27].
We plan to assist the users with uploading of annotated units
and to ensure that datasets are normalized and anonymized by
a unified procedure described in more detail in Section II. In
addition to the capture itself, a relevant annotation process
will be provided. Aside from plaintext annotation, the unit
can be given tags based on the content and intended use.
The platform user will also be able to edit this information
after the unit is shared and other users can leave comments
to any shared annotated unit. Because the users will have a
simple, direct way to contact the author of any annotated unit,
the annotation is likely to be kept up-to-date and accurate.
The assistance provided by our platform will simplify the
process of normalization while providing a unified form of
the output unit. That should keep the units organized and easy
to search for. Searching for an annotated unit containing a
specific event will be based on the unit’s identifier – its name,
annotation and assigned tags. A tag may denote the captured
protocol or application (SSH), identify the operating system
of communicating devices (Linux) or a name of a captured
anomaly, etc. By combining these tags, any user should be
able to find an annotated unit suitable to his/her specific needs.
The user will be able to download an annotated unit that is
being shared on the sharing platform. Besides downloading a
single unit, the platform will allow users to combine various
annotated units to ease follow-up creation of semi-labeled
dataset, as described in Section III. It is worth mentioning that
we plan to enable sharing of the combination of the annotated
units through the platform as well.
The proposed dataset sharing platform is intended as a com-
munity hub, where the community is provided with tools for
simple network data sharing. The unified procedures for nor-
malization with anonymization included will narrow the het-
erogeneity of the shared data and, at the same time, build trust
in the sharing platform. Furthermore, the community-based
approach will help to alleviate some workload from the
hub managers and ensure project sustainability with regular
updates. The initial content will be provided by us and
cooperating research teams before the sharing platform will be
publicly accessible. We have a large network with deployed
monitoring infrastructure at our disposal, which enables us to
provide units with various network events captured. Moreover,
we have a large virtual research environment KYPO [29] to
create artificial unit traces and regenerate existing ones with
updated features. We believe that the dataset sharing platform
based on our design will make dataset sharing more common
and help the reproducibility of results in future research.
V. RESEARCH EVALUATION
In order to catch up the objective performance of the
evaluated method, the datasets must be used for evaluation
in a consistent manner. Be it an objective method comparison
for benchmarking, evaluation of method on a given network,
or evaluation done for parameter estimation for higher level
methods, the problems and suggested solutions for dataset
usage outlined in this section apply to all of them. In this
section we discuss the methodology of using semi-labeled
datasets for evaluation and benchmarking. We outline the
problems and their possible solutions and discuss advantages
and disadvantages of respective approaches.
There are several works discussing the challenges related to
evaluation methodology. McHugh [15] extensively covers de-
ficiencies found in 1998 and 1999 DARPA intrusion detection
systems evaluation. Apart from the critique of the datasets
themselves, he points out the problematic estimation of the
sample of analysis and its distortion of results of an evaluation.
He also debates the fitness of ROC (Receiver Operating Curve)
for the purpose of expressing the evaluation results. Gharib
et al. [8] present a formula to estimate quality of datasets
for evaluation purposes and allow comparison. The formula
is based on 11 desired dataset characteristics: knowledge of
full dataset underlying network configuration, complete traffic
capture, labeling, complete interaction patterns, wide range of
available protocols, attack diversity, anonymity, heterogeneity
of data sources (packet captures, logs, ...), rich feature set, and
complete metadata. Tavallaee et al. [24] survey the evaluation
of anomaly detection systems performed by researchers. They
focus on reliability and validity of the evaluation methodology.
The reliability indicates the repeatability and robustness of the
evaluation, the validity indicates how much does the result of
the evaluation experiment attribute to the proposed approach.
In their survey, most of the recent works are found lacking.
They observe that metrics based on false/true positive/negative
are most often used for performance evaluation.
Problems associated with evaluation using dataset can be, in
essence, divided into two categories: qualitative and quantita-
tive. The qualitative aspect of evaluation using datasets relates
to the properties of the dataset itself – in order to achieve
objective evaluation, the dataset must contain realistic, diverse
data, that accurately reflect actual traffic. The quantitative
aspect contains the actual process of evaluation of the test
results. The evaluation process must give an objective metric
of the method efficiency. The most commonly used approach is
confusion matrix composed of true positive (TP), false positive
(FP), true negative (TN), and false negative (FN) values. The
confusion matrix is also used to compute another derived
metrics commonly used for the quantitative evaluation, such
as false positive/negative rate, precision, accuracy, and recall.
There are essentially three types of datasets: real-world
datasets, artificial datasets, and mixed (semi-labeled) datasets.
Each type has its own advantages and disadvantages in terms
of use for evaluation. We will discuss each type in detail
and show there is a trade-off between the qualitative and
quantitative aspect of evaluation for each type of dataset.
Datasets based on captured real-world traffic are best in
terms of unbiased representation of real traffic. However, the
evaluation of results is complicated. In order to compute the
metrics, the dataset needs to be labeled. That has proven to be
an extremely demanding task and there are only a few labeled
datasets available, most of them outdated. Furthermore, such
datasets cannot be easily modified for evaluation of a method
for a specific network or specific attack type. Since it is not
very likely that a general approach for labeling captured traffic
will be developed anytime soon, the datasets based solely on
captured traffic are not suitable for the purpose of objective
method evaluation.
On the other hand, the fully synthesized artificial datasets
are extremely well suited for quantitative evaluation since the
nature of the data in the dataset is fully known and the dataset
is well annotated. However, creating a dataset that accurately
imitates traffic in a real network and fulfills the qualitative
demands is challenging. The traffic in the network is generated
by an enormous variety of applications and the captured traffic
is often malformed due to errors adding another layer of
complexity. A solution of the problems with fully synthesized
datasets is not available at the moment. The synthesized traffic
is too out-of-the-book to challenge the evaluated methods.
The proposed semi-labeled datasets consisting of a mix of
real-world traffic and annotated units balance the qualitative
and qualitative aspects of the evaluation. The annotated unit
consists of attacks while the real-world traffic provides a
background for those attacks. The semi-labeled datasets can
be created easily and can be tailored to a specific network.
They are not completely realistic, but the capture provides
varied traffic, which accounts for a wide range of applications
and network errors. However, the background traffic can also
contain malicious traffic, which makes the quantitative evalu-
ation inaccurate. The problem is illustrated in Figure 4. The
dark gray area corresponds to malicious traffic from annotated
units, the rest is unlabeled. The light gray area corresponds to
data that were identified by the evaluated method as malicious.
Those identified data can be, with some effort, also labeled
since it should be a fraction of the original data (the gray
area is known). The true negative area is out of concern for
us at the moment, as the evaluated method does not identify
these data as malign and they are truly not malign. The
inaccuracy of evaluation comes from the white part of the false
negative region. This unknown volume of data comes from
the real-world dataset and is not identified by the method. Its
volume must be accounted for. Otherwise, all the measures of
false/true or positive/negative rates are not accurate. To address
this issue, we plan to consider a probabilistic-based evaluation
approach. We aim to experimentally estimate the probability
of occurrence of an attack in real-world traffic. Based on
this information, we will be able to derive the probability of
occurrence of FN during the evaluation and asses the method
with a certain degree of confidence.
Fig. 4. Confusion matrix in semi-labeled datasets.
There are several ways to improve the precision of the
quantitative evaluation based on semi-labelled datasets. Either
a condition on the mixing process can be formed in order to
bound the evaluation result’s error, or the unspecified part of
the false negative can be disregarded as it is likely to be small,
not affecting the evaluation results. In the mixing process,
either positive data can be added by mixing more attacks into
the traffic or the number of negative samples can be increased
by adding benign traffic.
However, adding either positive or negative annotated units
can skew the traffic composition and therefore influence the
evaluation of results as well. Adding positive units decreases
the influence of the unknown volume of false negatives, but it
increases the a priori probability that a sample is positive. On
the other hand, adding negative units can artificially decrease
false positive rate because they would probably be examples
of completely regular traffic. The most likely scenario is that
there will be several real-world traffic samples that are fre-
quently used as the background traffic in semi-labeled datasets
used for evaluation. Each use would lead to an examination
of the positive results not included in mixed annotated units.
The more the traffic samples are used, the fewer samples fall
into the unknown area of false negative results. The effective
reduction of the unknown area of false negative results requires
an extensive sharing of the positive results not included in
mixed datasets among the research community.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Research validation and verification are fundamental prin-
ciples of good scientific work. In terms of research in the
area of network traffic measurement and analysis, however,
these principles pose a great challenge. The research heavily
depends not only on the correct processes of data usage
but also on the availability of network traffic datasets that
meet the common requirements and are publicly available.
Without these datasets, we will never be able to reliably
repeat, validate, and analyze research results. To overcome
this challenge, we proposed the semi-labeled datasets approach
based on sharing of small annotated units of network traffic
that adopts our lessons learned from other research works.
The main idea of the discussed approach is based on
annotated units of network traffic that can be synthetically
generated, or derived from real-world traffic. These units
typically contain only a minimum of personal data, so they
can be shared and, thanks to the restrictions on the inclusion
of interest-related traffic only, be easily annotated. Annotated
units can be generated with a variety of traffic types, protocols,
or network attacks. They can be easily normalized and com-
bined with each other or with a real-world traffic to create
so-called semi-labeled datasets. The semi-labeled dataset is
represented by a combination of private traffic capture of
non-annotated real-world network traffic and an annotated
baseline that can be publicly shared. We are currently devel-
oping an open sharing platform that will allow the community
to provide such research data. We have also outlined the
basic methodology of using semi-labeled datasets to evaluate
research results and allow mutual comparison of different
analysis methods. We strive to cover all areas related to the
issue of research provability and believe that our approach
provides a comprehensive solution to challenges of research
provability and data sharing. All relevant source codes and ad-
ditional documentation of the proposed methodology are pub-
licly available at https://github.com/CSIRT-MU/TraceShare.
This article is the first introduction of the concept of
semi-labeled datasets in the area of network traffic sharing
and we are aware that there are many challenges that need
to be addressed in further research. Our goal is not to deal
with all identified problems at this point, but to present a
general solution in order to start a discussion of its usability.
We hope that the follow-up discussions will help us to move
forward to a solution that will be accepted by the research
community, help us to establish better research conditions, and
make research more accessible to other researchers and the
industry as well.
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